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NIO/W

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #553-82/1
25 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: L. Gray Cowan
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [redacted] 25X1

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. [redacted] 25X1

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 19 January 1982 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

L. Gray Cowan

Attachment
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[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA* No. 39

ANGOLA-SOUTH AFRICA

Analysts agreed that the Cuban forces are now more active and are stationed further south in Angola than in previous months. It would be premature, however, to say that Cubans are directly active against South African forces. South African forces continue to be active inside Angola in probes and raids and it is clear that there is active increasing South African military pressure on Angolan forces. The South Africans feel that a military defeat of SWAPO will enhance South African credit in the international communnity and will act as pressure on the Angolans to accept the terms agreed upon in Phase I of the Namibian negotiations. The South African position in the UN is hardening on the issue of UN impartiality and they are highlighting Soviet involvement in Angola. Analysts felt that too much pressure by the US on Dos Santos over the Cuban troop issue may cause the Soviets to replace Dos Santos with someone who would take a harder ideological line. [redacted] 25X1

SUDAN

Analysts noted the growing seriousness of Nimeiri's position. In order to enforce reforms required by the IMF agreement he has virtually asked for a vote of confidence from top officials of his government. (Subsequent to the meeting these officials declared their full support for Nimeiri and his policies.) [redacted] 25X1

GHANA

It is too soon to reach any judgment on the Rawlings government yet or on the degree of popular support for the overturn of Liman. Success will depend on his being able to put together an effective reform program and a government of capable individuals. We are unable to determine as yet whether Libyan offers of aid will be accepted or whether the Libyans will have any degree of influence over Rawlings. [redacted] 25X1

CHAD

Analysts agreed that the greatest danger over the next 90 days will be if nothing happens in Chad. If Goukouni is not persuaded to negotiate with Habre, there is any increasing possibility that Habre will move within the

*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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next 90 days to attempt to seize power by moving his forces closer to Ndjamena. Analysts thought it unlikely, however, that whatever action Habre takes, the Libyans will be invited to return. [redacted] 25X1

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